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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW
I. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE'
A. Rule 13, Counterclaims in Interpleader Actions
Liberty National Bank & Trust Co. v. Acme Tool Division'
was an interpleader action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335 in which
one of the defendants asserted a counterclaim against the plain-
tiff, Liberty Bank. Liberty had sold an oil drilling rig in which
appellee Hazel Bailey held a security interest subject to Liberty's
prior security interest. The sale was held to retire the debt of the
owner of the rig. Liberty had no experience in the sale of such
equipment and thus received far less than the value of the rig.
The receipts of the sale were sufficient to pay off the debt to
Liberty and the sale expenses but little more. Liberty filed suit
in interpleader and deposited the remaining funds for distribu-
tion to the remaining creditors. Mrs. Bailey filed a counterclaim
alleging that she had a security interest in the rig and that the
sale was not properly conducted. 3 The trial court found for Mrs.
Bailey in the amount of her security interest, $19,000, plus attor-
ney's fees.
Liberty maintained on appeal that the court lacked jurisdic-
tion to entertain the counterclaim under the Tenth Circuit rule
barring consideration of any issue other than entitlement to the
sum deposited in an interpleader action. Liberty relied on the
proposition that it was a mere disinterested stakeholder and thus
not an "opposing party" within the meaning of Rule 13.'
In earlier cases, the Tenth Circuit had held that an inter-
pleader claimant could not maintain a counterclaim against a
disinterested stakeholder.' It has been pointed out that the Tenth
I All references to rules in this section are to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2 540 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976).
' Mrs. Bailey's claim was based on the OKLAHOMA UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-
504 (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (1963)) which requires that such sales be carried
out in a "commercially reasonable manner."
' Rule 13 allows the filing of either compulsory or permissive counterclaims against
"opposing parties."
In First Nat'l Bank v. Johnson County Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 331 F.2d 325, 327
(10th Cir. 1964), the court, in dictum, stated that a disinterested stakeholder was not an
opposing party and the district court thus had no jurisdiction to entertain a counterclaim.
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Circuit stood alone in this interpretation of Rule 13(a) .6
Applying the "logical relation" test7 between the claim and
counterclaim, the court held that Mrs. Bailey's counterclaim was
compulsory.8 She therefore risked losing her claim altogether if it
could not be maintained in the present action. Since there are no
policy considerations against allowing such counterclaims and
since Rule 13 does not bar the maintenance of compulsory coun-
terclaims in interpleader actions, the court held that there was
no good reason to disallow the counterclaim in this case.' In so
holding, the court expressly overruled its earlier decisions insofar
as they barred the interposition of compulsory counterclaims in
interpleader actions.'" Apparently, though, permissive counter-
claims, i.e., those arising out of independent transactions, are
still barred in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Rule 15, Amendments to Pleadings
In R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co.1 defendant-appellant
Ralston Purina appealed from a judgment in an implied warranty
action brought under the Wyoming Uniform Commercial Code,"
seeking reversal on the issue of damages. Appellant claimed that
the lower court erred in allowing appellee to amend its complaint
on remand, 13 thereby allowing plaintiff-appellee to redefine its
damages claims and greatly increase the amount with the result
In Erie Bank v. United States Dist. Court, 362 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1966), the court adopted
the dictum of First Nat'l Bank and made it the rule in the Tenth Circuit. In Knoll v.
Socony Mobil Oil Co., 369 F.2d 425, 429 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977 (1967),
the court upheld the earlier holdings. However, Knoll was based on a transaction which
was independent of that giving rise to the interpleader action, i.e., a permissive counter-
claim.
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1715, at 448 (1972).
See Pipeliners Local 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 1974). The test is
met when the original claims and counterclaims arise from the same transaction or occur-
rence and logically relate because of their common origin. Id.
540 F.2d at 1379.
Id. at 1380.
lo Id. at 1381. The court specifically overruled First Nat'l Bank, Erie Bank, and Knoll,
supra note 5, to the extent they disallowed compulsory counterclaims. Id.
11 525 F.2d 749 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 WYo. STAT. §§ 34-2-314, -315 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
11 The case had been before the circuit court before in R.E.B., Inc. v. Ralston Purina,
No. 73-1627 (10th Cir., Apr. 17, 1974) (not for Routine Publication). Defendant had been
adjudged liable for breach of implied warranty, but the cause was remanded on the issue
of damages because the trial judge had failed to give any instructions on the matter of
damages.
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that the verdict on retrial was more than twice that originally
awarded. 4 The court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion either in allowing the particular amendments or in
doing so after remand. 5
The court went on to explain that Rule 15(a) "contemplates
allowing amendments freely when justice requires." Two factors
were cited as determining whether an amendment should be al-
lowed: (1) Whether it will cause delay and (2) whether the adver-
sary will suffer prejudice. The timing of the offer of an amend-
ment, i.e., following remand, does not of itself require denial of
leave to amend. In the case at bar, the court noted that the
amendments did not raise substantially different issues, nor did
they complicate the proceeding." There was thus no error in al-
lowing the requested amendments. 9
In Dell v. Heard"5 the Tenth Circuit addressed a problem
arising under Rule 15(b).21 Plaintiff-appellant argued that the
election of parties defense used by appellee was not properly
raised in appellee's answer. But since appellant had not objected
to the election defense as later amplified by appellee, the court
held that the issue was tried by the implied consent of the par-
ties."2
In New v. Utility Equipment Co. International3 the court
reversed the district court's denial of leave to amend the plain-
tiff's complaint since leave to amend should be "freely given
when justice so requires ' 24 and where no prejudice to the opposing
party will result.
25
1, 525 F.2d at 751. Under the new complaint, damages of $262,000 were awarded as




1 Id. at 752. The court pointed out that the issues of future profit losses and diminu-
tion of the value of property were present in the first trial. Id.
19 Id.
- 532 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
" Rule 15(b) provides: "When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express
or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings."
532 F.2d at 1332.
No. 75-1565 (10th Cir., Apr. 22, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
v Id. at 4.
2 Id.
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The court went on to hold that the statute of limitations did
not bar the amended claim since, under Rule 15(c), it related
back. 2 The proper test for determining whether an amendment
should be allowed to relate back was held to be whether the
opposing party had notice of the underlying fact situation and
whether substantial prejudice would result.
27
These amendment decisions indicate a continuing willing-
ness to construe Rule 15 liberally so long as no one is unduly
prejudiced by such construction.
C. Class Actions
1. Rule 23
In Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.21 defendant Safeway was
accused of discriminatory employment practices. 29 Plaintiff Tay-
lor sought relief both individually and as a class representative
30
but the district court narrowed the class claim. 3' At issue was
whether Taylor met the prerequisites for a class action under Rule
23(a) .32
The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court determination that
Taylor did not meet the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a)(3)
as defined in White v. Gates Rubber Co.:3 The plaintiff must
"demonstrate that other members of the class he purports to
" Rule 15(c) states: "Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended plead-
ing arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original
pleading."
" No. 75-1565 at 4.
, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975).
Safeway was charged with violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16, and with violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
" Taylor sought to represent the class of those "Negro persons who are employed,
have been employed, or might have been in the past or will in the future be employed by
Safeway .. .in its various wholesale, retail, and distribution centers throughout ...
Colorado." 524 F.2d at 266.
1' The class was narrowed to include only "Negroes employed at the frozen food
warehouse in the Denver distribution center." Id. at 266-67.
, Under Rule 23(a), one or more members of a class may sue or be sued on behalf of
a class only if:
(1) [T]he class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately pro-
tect the interests of the class.
u 53 F.R.D. 412 (D. Colo. 1971).
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represent [actual, not hypothetical complainants] have suffered
the same [or similar] grievances of which he complains." 3' After
summarily rejecting Taylor's claim that Title VII claims are not
subject to Rule 23, the court noted that there has been a failure
by the courts to give subsection (a)(3) a commonly accepted
meaning and that it is difficult to interpret (a)(3) in such a way
as not to be duplicative of subsection (a)(4) .1 The court then
accepted the White rationale that since (a)(3) was included as a
prerequisite it must have an independent meaning (that meaning
being that class action plaintiffs must at least establish that
"there is in fact a class needing representation") and that any
inquiry into typicality requires a comparison of the claims or
defenses of the representative with the claims or defenses of the
class.36
In the case at bar, the court upheld the trial court finding
that Taylor failed to show the existence of any discriminatory
practices outside the warehouse in which he was employed and
concluded that the trial court had no alternative but to limit the
class accordingly. 7 The court also rejected Taylor's contention
that his "across the board" attack of Safeway's employment
practices was sufficient to sustain the class claim, especially since
that argument, too, would render subsection (a)(3) superfluous.3
In Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc.31 the court reversed a
lower court finding that the plaintiffs were not representative of
the class involved. 0 The lower court's reliance on the facts that
one plaintiff was not indigent nor a resident of the local Navajo
reservation and that another lived out of state (but within fifty
31 524 F.2d at 269 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
u 524 F.2d at 269-70. In fact, both (a)(3) and (a)(4) were derived from a single phrase
in the original Rule 23: "one or more [representatives], as will fairly insure the adequate
representation of all .... " Id.
-u 524 F.2d at 270 (quoting White v. Gates Rubber Co., 53 F.R.D. 412, 415 (D. Colo.
1971)).
31 524 F.2d at 270.
11 Id. The Tenth Circuit stated that it would be "unrealistic" for a court to compare
plaintiff's claims and defenses with the hypothetical claims of a hypothetical class. Id. at
270-71.
3' 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975).
Relief was sought on behalf of "all persons of Navajo Indian descent who live in or
near the City of Farmington, New Mexico or frequent that city such as that might be
expected to seek emergency care in San Juan Hospital." Id. at 1183.
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
miles) was deemed misplaced since the plaintiffs did not purport
to represent only indigent reservation residents.4
Then, in apparent contradiction to Taylor, the court noted
that subsections (a)(3) and (a)(4) are often seen as duplicative,
completely ignoring the White rationale.42 However, the issue was
resolvable without this dicta since under the facts the plaintiffs
were indeed found to have met the typicality requirement; the
court held that all that was neccessary was that the claims of the
plaintiffs and of the other class members be based on the same
legal or remedial theory, thus in effect reverting to the White
test. 3
The court also reversed the district court's denial of a perma-
nent injunction because of noncompliance with Rule 65(a)(2)."
The lower court had consolidated the permanent injunction issue
with a preliminary injunction hearing without the appropriate
court order thus depriving the parties of proper notice.
In Hernandez v. Gray15 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court dismissal of a class action on the ground that a class action
may not be maintained by a putative representative who is not a
member of the class. Plaintiffs failed to establish a case or contro-
versy against the defendant because they had voluntarily left
their jobs for reasons unrelated to the present claim of discrimina-
tion.
In Royal Resources Corp. v. Bottger (In re King Resources
Co. Securities Litigation)" the court considered the question of
the propriety of a class certification in a complicated securities
case in which 16,000 individuals with diverse interests consti-
tuted the class. In spite of the chance of such great expense to
the defendants as to constitute irreparable harm, the court dis-
missed the appeal as premature since the trial court had yet to
Id. at 1188-89. See purported class note 40 supra.
528 F.2d at 1189 (citing 3B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.06-2 (1971)). See text
accompanying note 35 supra.
11 528 F.2d at 1189. Requiring that the claims of the class and its representatives be
based on the same legal theory differs very little from requiring a comparison of the claims
of the representatives with the claims of the class and finding a class in fact needing
representation.
11 Id. at 1186. Rule 65(a)(2) authorizes the consolidation of a preliminary injunction
hearing with a trial on the merits by court order but provides that the subsection is to be
so construed "as to save to the parties any rights they may have to trial by jury."
-s 530 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1976).
46 525 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1975).
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seek to create subclasses and was presently narrowing the
issues."
In Ryan v. Shea"8 the district court had held that "because
the class [was] formed pursuant to [Rule 23(b)(2) rather than
(b)(3)] no notice to the members of the class [was] required."'"
Since there was no objection to this ruling at the trial level, the
Tenth Circuit did not directly address the question, but did note
that district courts in the circuit have ruled that prejudgment
notice is not required when the action is brought under 23(b)(2).10
2. Other Rules as They Affect Class Actions
In Phillips v. Clark (In re Four Seasons Securities Laws
Litigation)5' plaintiff-appellant was an absent class member
who sought to be relieved of the class action judgment by filing a
motion under Rule 60(b).1s Appellant claimed he had new infor-
mation of which he was unaware at the time judgment was en-
tered. The court rejected his claim, holding that appellant was
represented by the actual parties of the class, thus making their
knowledge of the information imputable to him as well.
53
The court also held that appellant did not become a "party"
for purposes of 60(b) since he took no action, upon adequate
notice, to identify himself with the court proceedings. 4 It was
stated that the fact absent classmembers are bound by a judg-
11 Id. at 213. The court did not expressly rely on Rule 23(c)(4), but that rule provides
that a class action may be brought in respect to particular issues or that a class may be
divided into subclasses, with each subclass treated as a class subject to the other provi-
sions of Rule 23.
525 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1975).
, Id. at 275. Rule 23(b)(2) allows class actions where the opposing party has acted
or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class thereby making final injunc-
tive relief or declaratory relief appropriate with respect to the class as a whole. Rule
23(b)(3) allows class actions where the questions of law or fact common to the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and where a class
action is superior to other available methods for resolving the controversy. Rule 23(c)(2)
expressly requires notice only in actions maintained under 23(b)(3) and does not mention
notice in regard to (b)(2) actions.
50 525 F.2d at 275.
51 525 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
52 Rule 60(b) allows motions by a party or his legal representative for relief from a
final judgment on several grounds, the relevant ones here being based on lack of knowl-
edge.
" 525 F.2d at 502.
Id. at 504.
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ment does not in itself make such members "parties" for 60(b)
purposes. 5
In Burdick Contractors, Inc. v. Nelson56 the court stated the
rule that a class action where there has been adequate notice and
representation bars individual suits arising from the same trans-
actions, but upheld the separate claims in the present case on the
particular facts.
Hellerstein v. Mr. Steak, Inc. 57 presented the question of the
appealability of an interlocutory order granting class action sta-
tus. Defendant-appellant relied on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin8
for the proposition that such orders are "final decisions" within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus appealable. The Tenth
Circuit distinguished Eisen on the ground that in that case the
Supreme Court was influenced by a burdensome notice require-
ment in granting final order status, a factor not present in the
case at bar. 9 This keeps the Tenth Circuit in line with the pre-
vailing view that such orders are not appealable unless they
sound a "death knell" to the entire case or place an undue burden
on the parties. 0
D. Rule 54: Judgments and Third-Party Practice
United Bank v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.6 arose
from Hartford's denial of coverage under a banker's blanket bond
issued to the United Bank of Pueblo for a cash letter stolen while
being transported to the United Bank of Denver. Hartford had
filed a third-party complaint against the Denver bank which was
severed from the original complaint for purposes of the trial. Ten
months after judgment had been entered against Hartford in the
original action, the Pueblo bank moved for entry of final judg-
ment under Rule 54(b)2 The motion was granted and Hartford
appealed.
Id.
, No. 75-1315 (10th Cir., Mar. 1, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
'T 531 F.2d 470 (10th Cir. 1976).
417 U.S. 156 (1974) (Eisen III).
531 F.2d at 473.
See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966) (Eisen I).
" 529 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1976).
, Rule 54(b) allows entry of final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims
or parties where there are multiple claims or parties only upon express determination that
there is no just reason for delay.
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The Tenth Circuit noted that there is no precise test for
determining what constitutes "just cause for delay" but stated
the general rule that the determination rests on a balancing test,
weighing the policy of preventing "piecemeal appeals" against
the hardship or injustice that might be inflicted on a litigant by
further delay . 3 On balance, the most important factor in the
court's view was that the as yet unlitigated action between Hart-
ford and the Denver bank would be facilitated by entry of final
judgment in the principal claim since the second action depended
on that claim. 4 It was thus concluded that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in granting the motion. 5
E. Rule 56: Summary Judgment
In Taylor v. Branch66 the court, reversing the lower court's
grant of summary judgment for defendant, reiterated the rule
that summary judgment should be granted only when the moving
party has established the absence of any genuine issue as to a
material fact. 7 But the court had to consider two other questions
in regard to Rule 56 as well. The first was whether a plaintiff
waives the right to challenge such a motion by failing to file
opposing affidavits or other evidence. Ordinarily, a plaintiff may
not rest on his pleadings in opposing a motion for summary judg-
ment, 8 but the court held that this case fell within a recognized
exception: A plaintiff may rest on his pleadings where the evi-
dence supporting the motion fails to show the absence of a genu-
ine issue as to any material fact.69 The second issue was whether
a formal hearing is required. The court held that a formal hearing
may be avoided by adoption of a local rule,70 thus adopting the
" 529 F.2d at 492.
*, Id. at 493. In fact, the court noted that final judgment was beneficial because if
Hartford's liability were to be reversed on appeal, the whole third-party action would be
moot. Id.
' Id.
" No. 75-1072 (10th Cir., Oct. 20, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
7 Id. at 3 (citing Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d
168 (10th Cir. 1974); James v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 173 (10th Cir. 1972)).
" No. 75-1072 at 5.
Id. at 5 (citing Sterner Aero AB v. Page AirMotive, Inc., 499 F.2d 709 (10th Cir.
1974); Riggs v. British Commonwealth Corp., 459 F.2d 449 (10th Cir. 1972)).
70 No. 75-1072 at 6. The court cited Rule 78, which reads as follows:
Unless local conditions make it impracticable, each district court shall
establish regular times and places, at intervals sufficiently frequent for the
1977
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view of the Third, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits.7 However,
the court indicated that absent a local rule, a formal hearing
might be required," but since there was no evidence to show
whether the district court had such a rule, the lower court's action
was assumed proper in this regard.7"
II. FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. In Rem-In Personam Jurisdiction
In the past year the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals twice
recognized the fine distinction between in rem7' and in personam
proceedings.75 Both cases involved an Oklahoma statute7" which
controls jurisdiction in trust cases.
In Southwestern Bank & Trust Co. v. Metcalf State Bank77
revenue bondholders sued the trustee pursuant to a mortgage
indenture relating to the bond issue. Defendant Metcalf and the
bond issuer Claremore sued in state court in 1972 for liquidation
of the trust property. When the plaintiff bondholders subse-
quently sued alleging breaches of contract and fiduciary duty by
the co-trustees, the federal district court dismissed their com-
plaint for lack of jurisdiction.
prompt dispatch of business, at which motions requiring notice and hearing
may be heard and disposed of; but the judge at any time or place and on
such notice, if any, as he considers reasonable may make orders for the
advancement, conduct, and hearing of actions.
To expedite its business, the court may make provision by rule or order
for the submission and determination of motions without oral hearing upon
brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition.
71 See Spark v. Catholic Univ., 510 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Parish v. Howard, 459
F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1972); Season-All Indus., Inc. v. Turkiye Sise Ve Cam Fabrikalari, A.S.,
425 F.2d 34 (3d Cir. 1970); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320 F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 985 (1964).
72 No. 75-1072 at 6 (citing Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964)).
7 No. 75-1072 at 6.
7 [J]urisdiction . . . could be asserted in rem or quasi in rem by basing
the court's ability to proceed on its power over local property or status rela-
tionships, rather than the presence of defendant himself . . . . [Hiowever,
the property or status had to be present within the borders of the court's
geographic domain.
4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1070, by 266 (1969). See
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
" See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7S OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23 (1971).
77 525 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Buck v. Hales s the alleged discretionary income benefici-
aries sued the co-trustees of the trust for wrongful payment under
the terms of a will. The plaintiffs requested the imposition of a
constructive trust on certain mineral interests and the forfeiture
of certain rights of other beneficiaries. Again, the federal district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In both cases the Tenth Circuit saw the nature of the pro-
ceeding as dispositive of the concurrent jurisdiction dilemma.
Precedent supported the rule of exclusive jurisdiction for the
court which first had possession of the trust property when con-
current in rem proceedings were filed in different courts.7" For the
Tenth Circuit, the key issue was whether the designation of a
proceeding as in rem by this Oklahoma statute0 was conclusive
in a federal action.
In Southwestern Bank the Tenth Circuit, applying the Erie
doctrine,"' held that the state statute's designation was not bind-
ing on the federal court. It found that the federal action existed
independently of the state statute and that the statute was
"really designed to place jurisdiction over the described causes of
action in a particular state court." 2 Ignoring the state statute's
designation of the action as in rem, the Tenth Circuit concen-
trated on three factors: (1) The lack of interference with the trust
property; (2) the breach of duty allegations not being brought in
the state suit; and (3) the relief requested being money damages.1
3
7N 536 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1976).
71 Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490 (1946); Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456
(1939); Kline v. Beuke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145
(10th Cir. 1970); Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); Milam v. Sol Newman
Co., 205 F. Supp. 649 (D.C. Ala. 1962).
" OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23(A) (1971) provides: "The district court shall have
original jurisdiction . . . in its discretion to supervise the administration of trusts; and
all actions hereunder are declared to be proceedings in rem."
" [T]he jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is
grounded on their de facto power over the dedendant's person. Hence his
presence within the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to its
rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But now . . . due process
requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam,
if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain mini-
mum contacts with it such that maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).




Regardless of this statute's designation of trust administration
actions as in rem, the Tenth Circuit found the presence of these
three factors to indicate an in personam proceeding totally dis-
tinct from the state action.
In Buck the court reemphasized that the determinative fac-
tors identified in the analogous Southwestern Bank case 4 were
the remedy requested and the degree of interference with the
trust property which constituted the basis of the state court ac-
tions. In contrast with the plaintiff's complaint in Southwestern
Bank, the appellants in Buck had requested relief that, if
granted, would have greatly interfered with the state court's con-
tinuing supervision of the trust's administration. To have given
the appellants this relief would have directly contradicted the
state court's continuing directions to the trustee.5
The appellants also argued a second ground for their claim
of in personam jurisdiction in the federal court, namely, that the
assets they sought were no longer in the state court's possession,
but had already been distributed. This argument was summarily
rejected because "the actual handling of the trust property by the
fiduciaries" was a matter of administration within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the state. 6
In Guarantee Reserve Life v. World Market Centers7 the
Tenth Circuit faced a similar jurisdictional conflict in an inter-
pleader action. Both the decedent's wife and the receiver for
World Market Centers, the decedent's employer, claimed the pro-
ceeds of an insurance policy on the decedent's life. Before the
filing of the interpleader action in federal court, the receiver al-
leged exclusive summary jurisdiction in the Texas Bankruptcy
" 536 F.2d at 1331-32.
, Id. at 1331. W.T. Hales died testate in 1938. The state court had construed various
terms of the trust since 1943. The trustees had been directed to follow a certain course of
action with respect to the trust property. The co-trustees had been given further adminis-
tration instructions in the ensuing years. The most recent judgment of the state court
construing the trust was entered March 26, 1975.
11 Id. at 1332 (quoting Kittredge v. Stevens, 126 F.2d 263, 267 (1st Cir. 1942)). The
Kittredge court cited Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939), as holding that
"where the 'contentions are solely as to administration' a federal court has no jurisdiction
over the suit even though the complainant may not be asking the court to grant relief
which would immediately affect a res within the custody of a state court." 126 F.2d at
267.
'" No. 74-1881 (10th Cir., Nov. 10, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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Court based on World Market Centers' possession of the policy.
Precedent clearly determined that an interpleader action is
an in personam proceeding and that the second concurrent action
is subject to the binding effects of the prior decision under the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel."5 The Tenth Cir-
cuit avoided the conceptual difficulties inherent in the applica-
tion of the "constructive possession" 9 doctrine by the Texas
Bankruptcy Court. Instead, the Tenth Circuit found that an in-
terpleader action begins with the filing of the insurance proceeds
with the clerk of the federal district court. The adverse nature of
the insurance company's possession of the proceeds and its
commencement of the interpleader action against the receiver
and the decedent's wife was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
federal court." The court then affirmed the district court's find-
ing on the merits that the receiver's evidence did not overcome
the decedent's wife's indicia of ownership.
B. Statutory Jurisdiction
In Cooper v. United States' a former inmate of Leavenworth
Penitentiary sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages
for an intentional injury caused by a fellow inmate. Citing United
States v. Denko,92 the Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the Prison
Industries Fund93 provision was the exclusive remedy for such
actions. The Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that the
"intentional" aspect of the tortfeasor-inmate's act removed the
action from the exclusive coverage of work related accidents en-
's See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
" Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966) (quoting Thompson v. Magnolia Petro-
leum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940) (bankruptcy courts "have summary jurisdiction to
adjudicate controversies relating to property over which they have actual or constructive
possession"); Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox, 264 U.S. 426, 431 (1924) (where the
rights of trustees to property adversely claimed were in issue, Congress could grant juris-
diction over the person who has possession of the property)).
" No. 74-1881 at 9. See In re Herz Impacting Corp., 349 F. Supp. 1106 (S.D.N.Y.
1972) (insurer resisted claims of control by daughter and the bankruptcy trustee). This
type of interest, the heart of classic interpleaded cases, is, in effect, an adverse claim to
control of the fund.
91 No. 75-1461 (10th Cir., Dec. 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
-2 385 U.S. 149 (1966). See also Granade v. United States, 356 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1966);
Nobles v. Federal Prison Indus., Inc., 213 F. Supp. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1963).
0 18 U.S.C. § 4126 (1970) (accident compensation for inmates).
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compassed by the Prison Industries Fund. Intentional injuries
were found to be distinguishable from accidental ones only within
the class of self-inflicted injuries .
4
In Melendez v. Singer-Friden Corp.95 the plaintiff alleged
employment discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 19646 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Injunctive relief was specifi-
cally requested only under the Title VII claim. On the Title VII
claim, the defendants obtained summary judgment because the
plaintiff filed too late and no equitable consideration justified the
tolling of the statute of limitations. The Tenth Circuit, on review,
held that an appeal of the interlocutory order dismissing the
claim was properly granted. Relying on analogous precedent, 7 the
Tenth Circuit found that the posture and scope of the injunctive
relief requested was sufficiently curtailed by the partial summary
judgment to warrant its appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1292(a)(1).1s
In Williams v. Southern Union Gas Co.9 an unlawful job
discharge case, the Tenth Circuit reviewed the "two letter" proce-
dure of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).9 0 On May 30, 1973, the plaintiff received a letter from
the EEOC advising him that if he wanted to sue he should ask
9, 28 C.F.R. § 301.9 (1976). The federal prison regulations provide:
Injuries sustained by inmate workers willfully or with intent to injure some-
one else, or injuries suffered in any activity not directly related to their work
assignment are not compensable, and no claim for compensation for such
injuries will be considered. Any injury resulting from willful violation of rules
and regulations may prevent award of compensation.
529 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1976).
, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1970), as amended by Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L.
No. 93-608, § 3(1), 88 Stat. 1972.
11 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 461 F.2d 1040 (2d Cir. 1972)
(summary judgment in trademark case denying injunctive relief appealable as an interlo-
cutory order); Yaffe v. Powers, 454 F.2d 1362 (1st Cir. 1972) (in request for injunctive relief
from police surveillance, the court's refusal to recognize a class considerably narrowed the
scope of any possible injunctive relief in the event plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and
thus was appealable as a denial of the relief requested); Build of Buffalo, Inc. v. Sedito,
441 F.2d 284 (2d Cir. 1971) (order dismissing certain defendants in civil rights action
against whom injunction sought was appealable).
1' 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970) provides: "Jurisdiction will lie when . . . interlocu-
tory orders . . . granting, continuing, modifying, refusing, or dissolving injunctions, or
refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court .... "
" 529 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1976).
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1970).
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for a "right-to-sue" letter and that he would have ninety days
from the time he received that letter to bring suit. The right-to-
sue letter was requested and issued on December 6, 1973, and
Williams brought suit on March 6, 1974. Judgment was entered
for the defendant and both parties raised issues on appeal. South-
ern Union requested review of the jurisdiction of the trial court
on the ground that Williams' suit was brought too late.
Southern Union contended that pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f)(1) the jurisdiction of a United States district court, in
a private enforcement action, was limited to a period of 270 days
from the date of the complaint's filing with the Commission. In
the alternative, Southern Union contended that Williams' failure
to bring suit within ninety days after receiving the initial letter
notifying him of the Commission's fruitless conciliation efforts
barred his action. 10
The Tenth Circuit cited the recent Eighth Circuit case, Tuft
v. McDonnell,"2 where that court faced the same jurisdictional
argument as that advanced by Southern Union. There, the
Eighth Circuit held that the 180-day period in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f) is not a deadline for issuance of notice to a complaining party
by the Commission. 103 Relying upon precedent and the statute's
legislative history, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that the Commis-
sion could still bring suit after the 180-day period expired. 04 The
administrative proceeding was not finished until a decision was
made regarding the filing of suit. Only after this decision was the
aggrieved party entitled to be notified of his right to sue privately.
The Eighth Circuit found that the two-letter procedure com-
plied with the statute and, consequently, that the aggrieved
party's right to sue did not begin until he had received the right-
to-sue letter.0 5 The first letter in the two-letter sequence was
merely notice to the aggrieved party of the Commission's failure
at conciliation and not necessarily the end of the administrative
process. The issuance of the formal right-to-sue letter signaled
the termination of the administrative process.' °" Since the Com-
"' 529 F.2d at 486.
102 517 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 1052 (1976).
" 517 F.2d at 1305-09.
104 Id.
I Id. at 1309.
'u Id. at 1307-09.
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mission had not exhausted its administrative remedies under
Title VII at the time of the first letter, there was no basis for
construing this letter as the statutory notice initiating the ninety-
day limitation period. The Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth
Circuit's entire rationale and held that the trial court was correct
in asserting its subject matter jurisdiction. 7
C. Federal Tort Claims Act
The Tenth Circuit reviewed various tort actions against the
United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act'° and its juris-
dictional counterpart. 109 These claims are of greater interest for
their applications of respective state law than for their jurisdic-
tional import. In the prior year, allegations of medical malprac-
tice," breach of duty from landowner to entrant,"' and federal
employee liability"' were asserted as grounds for federal tort
claims.
More informative than the jurisdictional aspects of Hartzell
v. United States"' was the Tenth Circuit's application of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence."' In 1971 the Colorado Supreme
Court replaced the traditional common law status classifications
of entrants upon another's land with the more flexible
"foreseeability and reasonable care" standard for landowners."'
Prior to Hartzell, the Tenth Circuit had applied this doctrine only
once, in 1972.116
"0 529 F.2d at 487.
' 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1970).
,0 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970) (United States as defendant).
,, Casias v. United States, No. 75-1595 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication).
" Tracey v. United States, No. 74-1633 (10th Cir., Oct. 17, 1975) (Not for Routine
Publication).
"I Turner v. United States, No. 75-1457 (10th Cir., Apr. 2, 1976) (Not for Routine
Publication); Tunder v. United States, 522 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 75-1603 (10th Cir., Aug. 9, 1976) (Not for Routine Publication).
' Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971).
" The court in Mile High Fence stated:
It becomes obvious from an in depth analysis of the various sections and
comments of the Restatement, that status, particularly that of licensee or
invitee, is not the controlling determinant of liability. Again it is the foresee-
ability of harm from the failure by the possessor to carry on his activities with
reasonable care for the safety of the entrants which determines liability.
Id. at 547, 489 P.2d at 314.
"' Smith v. Mill Creek Court, Inc., 457 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1972).
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In Hartzell the plaintiff alleged that failure to remove dan-
gerous conditions or to warn spectators of them at an Air Force
Academy football game was unreasonable conduct. Citing the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the court found that "reasonable
care on the part of the possessor. . . does not ordinarily require
precautions, or even a warning against dangers which are known
to the visitor, or so obvious to him.""' The Tenth Circuit has, in
this opinion and the 1972 Smith opinion, taken an approach that
is consistent with the applicability as well as the tenor of the
doctrine of Mile High Fence. "8
The Tenth Circuit also reviewed the application of the res
ipsa loquitor doctrine in two suits against the United States. In
Udseth v. United States"9 the trial court refused to apply the
minority rule that the instructor pilot of a dual control aircraft is
responsible for the plane's operation. 20 The Tenth Circuit af-
firmed, stating that New Mexico law forbade the application of
res ipsa loquitor in the absence of any evidence as to who was in
control of the plane.'
In Federal Insurance Co. v. United States' the court allowed
the plaintiff to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor where a tank
exploded at the electroplating facility at Tinker Air Force Base,
Oklahoma. Even though the plaintiff could not prove which of
three possible theories accounted for the explosion, the district
court held that the identification of the precise instrumentality
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1964). For further discussion of the
importance and impact of the growing trend away from the traditional common law status
classifications, see Comment, Premise Liability: Foreseeable Emergence of the Com-
munity Standard, 51 DEN. L.J. 145 (1974).
"I The applicability of the Mile High Fence doctrine regardless of the plaintiff's
status seems to be the general tenor of the Tenth Circuit. The applicability of Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968), was not extended beyond
the class of invitees in two subsequent cases. Solgaard v. Guy F. Atkinson, 16 Cal. App.
3d 881, 94 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1971); Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d
20, 77 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1969). See also Comment, supra note 117.
"' 530 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1976).
' For a discussion of the minority rule, see Lange v. Nelson-Ryan Flight Serv., Inc.,
259 Minn. 460, 108 N.W.2d 428 (1961).
' 530 F.2d at 862. There was no New Mexico case directly on point; consequently,
the views of the resident district judge were persuasive and ordinarily accepted. Stevens
v. Barnard, 512 F.2d 876, 880 (10th Cir. 1975). The trial court had held the presumption
that the pilot in command was in exclusive control as not permissible.
1- 538 F.2d 300 (10th Cir. 1976).
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was sufficient for the doctrine's application. On the basis of this
precise identification, the lack of any defects in the tank's compo-
nent parts, and the fact that tanks do not usually explode in the
absence of negligence, the Tenth Circuit held that negligence on
the part of the Government was a reasonable inference.12
Michael A. Maxwell
John L. Ruppert
CONTINGENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS IN DETERMINATION
OF REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES IN CHAPTER XI
PROCEEDINGS:
Stipe v. Mullendore, 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CHARLES P. LEDER*
In Stipe v. Mullendore' the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered whether a trial court had erred in not awarding attor-
neys' fees pursuant to a contingent fee arrangement in a Chapter
XI bankruptcy proceeding and whether a $365,000 award of attor-
neys' fees was reasonable. The attorneys in this action were re-
tained "to collect all or as much as possible of the proceeds of life
insurance policies having a combined face value of $15 million."2
Because their clients were confronted with both secured and un-
secured creditors having claims exceeding $8 million, the attor-
neys filed a Chapter XI bankruptcy petition on behalf of their
clients and entered into a contingent fee agreement whereby the
attorneys "would receive 20% of the amount recovered from an
2 The difficult issue for the court was the possibility that the heater was not in "the
exclusive control" of the Government since it consisted of component parts. Citing Carter
Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okla. 209, 232 P. 419 (1924), the test is, when
there are several instrumentalities involved, some of which are under the control of the
defendant and others not, could the accident reasonably have occurred because of defects
in the instrumentality supplied by another?
* Associate, Berenbaum, Weinberger & Susman, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1973, Uni-
versity of Colorado; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
(In re Mullendore) 527 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 1033.
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action against the insurance companies" and another claimant of
the proceeds.
3
A successful arrangement was reached satisfying the credi-
tors of the clients. In addition, the attorneys successfully negoti-
ated a settlement of their clients' claims against the insurance
companies. Under the terms of this settlement, the clients re-
ceived $5 million and the other claimant $3 million. After com-
pleting the Chapter XI arrangement and obtaining $5 million for
their clients, the attorneys filed an amended application with the
bankruptcy court "for an allowance of $1 million for attorneys'
fees. The request was based on 20% of the $5 million insurance
recovery and the 6,168 hours expended by [the] attorneys."'
This request was challenged by the clients, who by this time had
retained other counsel, and a hearing was held to determine the
proper fee. At the hearing the trial judge "indicated the contin-
gent fee contract would not be considered in arriving at a fee" and
instead made an allowance on a quantum meruit basis. The trial
court awarded $365,000 as the reasonable attorneys' fee and this
decision was appealed.
After finding that the attorneys were entitled to compensa-




The clients asserted that the attorneys should not be compensated because of their
failure to comply with General Order 44, which was abrogated by the Supreme Court on
October 1, 1973. 527 F.2d at 1035 & n.7. The Tenth Circuit held that this Order did not
cover debtors who, as in this case, were not in possession; the court thus reached a decision
similar to that reached by the Sixth Circuit in Cle-Ware Indus., Inc. v. Sokolsky, 493 F.2d
863 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 829 (1974). But see In re Hydrocarbon Chem., Inc.,
411 F.2d 203 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969). The Tenth Circuit stated:
In a Chapter XI proceeding, there are areas where counsel for a debtor not
in possession legitimately should function. To the extent that the work of
such counsel benefits the estate, compensation is normally allowed on proper
petition. Consequently, we hold that failure to comply with General Order
44 does not prevent [the attorneys] from receiving compensation.
527 F.2d at 1035-36 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1036 n.9.
The clients further argued that the attorneys in this case had failed to comply with
section 62(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 102(c) (1970), requiring a prior court
ruling regarding retention of counsel. However, the Tenth Circuit found no merit in the
contention. 527 F.2d at 1036. Finally, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the clients' conten-
tion that section 324 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1970), required disallowance
of fees. This section requires a bankruptcy petition to disclose the executory contracts of
the debtor. The Tenth Circuit found that compliance with the section would have allowed
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whether the fees should have been awarded pursuant to the con-
tingent fee agreement. In making its determination, the court did
not specifically decide whether contingent fee agreements were
permissible in a bankruptcy action; instead, the court's opinion
focused on whether the attorneys' fees awarded were reasonable.
The court analyzed sections 60(d) and 64(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act 7 which allow an attorney compensation "only to the extent
of a reasonable amount to be determined by the court."8 In the
opinion of the Tenth Circuit, the Act prescribes "a single test in
determining the amount of attorneys' fees; that test is reasona-
bleness. '
The trial court had discretion in the awarding of attorneys'
fees and the Tenth Circuit refused to interfere with that discre-
tion because there was no showing that the "allowance was
plainly wrong or an abuse of discretion."'" However, the court did
set forth some of the factors it felt should be considered in a
determination of whether fees awarded by a bankruptcy court are
reasonable.
One factor to be considered by a trial court in an award of
attorneys' fees is a contingent fee agreement. The court specifi-
cally stated that the contingent fee agreement "might have had
some evidentiary value";" however, failure to consider such an
agreement is not reversible error because the ultimate determina-
tion of fees does not depend upon the agreement between the
client and the lawyer. Rather, the ultimate test is reasonable-
ness; hence, unreasonable fees are excessive and cannot be
awarded to an attorney.
court review of the fee contract early in the proceeding but could "find no compelling logic
or legal requirement for disallowing all compensation because the executory contract,
disregarded by the trial court, was not disclosed pursuant to § 724." 527 F.2d at 1037.
11 U.S.C. §§ 96(d), 104(a) (1970).
Id. § 96(d).
527 F.2d at 1038.
Id. (quoting Behringer v. Lybrand & Morgan, 270 F.2d 670 (10th Cir. 1959)).
II 527 F.2d at 1038.
I2 d. The court held that failure to consider the contingent fee arrangement would
be harmless error under Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure inasmuch as the
ultimate test of the fee was reasonableness as determined by the trial court. Id.
" See Bankruptcy Act § 60(d), 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1970), which provides attorneys'
fees shall be allowed "only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the
court, and the excess may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate."
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As a result, the utility to the lawyer of a contingent fee agree-
ment is reduced. The historical and practical reasons for the use
of contingent fees disappear if the successful conclusion of an
action will not produce that which motivated the lawyer to accept
an otherwise undesirable case-namely, the "res out of which the
fee can be paid."" Under the court's ruling in Mullendore, the
trial court when computing reasonable fees may consider a con-
tingent fee agreement for whatever evidentiary value the agree-
ment may have, but it is not bound by the terms of that agree-
ment. Therefore, because the ultimate determination of the fee
rests with the court and is not based on the terms of the contin-
gent fee agreement, a lawyer in a bankruptcy proceeding, or any
other proceeding allowing only awards of a reasonable fee, will
find a contingent fee agreement of little practical value.
Even though the computation of a reasonable fee in a bank-
ruptcy proceeeding rests with the trial court, the Tenth Circuit
pointed out other traditional factors that should guide a court in
making the award. The court stated that the amount of the award
in Mullendore indicated that the trial court had considered:
[T]he contingent aspect of the [attorneys'] employment as it re-
lated to the results obtained; the size of the estate; the time and
labor involved; the results actually obtained; the novelty and com-
" ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILnTY (1975) states as Ethical Consideration
2-20 the following:
Contingent fee arrangements in civil cases have long been commonly ac-
cepted in the United States in proceedings to enforce claims. The historical
bases of their acceptance are that (1) they often, and in a variety of circum-
stances, provide the only practical means by which one having a claim
against another can economically afford, finance, and obtain the services of
a competent lawyer to prosecute his claim, and (2) a successful prosecution
of the claim produces a res out of which the fee can be paid. Although a
lawyer generally should decline to accept employment on a contingent fee
basis by one who is able to pay a reasonable fixed fee, it is not necessarily
improper for a lawyer, where justified by the particular circumstances of a
case, to enter into a contingent fee contract in a civil case with any client
who, after being fully informed of all relevant factors, desires that arrange-
ment. Because of the human relationships involved and the unique character
of the proceedings, contingent fee arrangements in domestic relation cases
are rarely justified. In administrative agency proceedings contingent fee con-
tracts should be governed by the same consideration as in other civil cases.
Public policy properly condemns contingent fee arrangements in criminal
cases, largely on the ground that legal services in criminal cases do not
produce a res with which to pay the fee.
Id. at 7C (footnotes omitted).
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plexity of the legal problems involved; the opposition encountered;
the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys involved; and
the debtors' ability to pay.5
An analysis of the award given by the trial court satisfied the
Tenth Circuit that there had been no abuse of discretion in the
awarding of fees. The Tenth Circuit relied upon the judgment of
the trial court "to [give] credit where credit was due and to
avoid payment for duplicative services."'"
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) AND THE APPEARANCE OF
IMPARTIALITY
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.
1976)
INTRODUCTION
December 5, 1974 marked the revision of a federal statute
addressing standards for disqualification of judges, 28 U.S.C. §
455.' Subsection (a) of the revised section 455 states: "Any jus-
tice, judge, magistrate, or referee in bankruptcy of the United
States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
527 F.2d at 1040. See Disciplinary Rule 2-106(B), which provides that:
A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordi-
nary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee
is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions
involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the
particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers per-
forming the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
ABA, supra note 14, at 12C (footnote omitted).
'e 527 F.2d at 1040.
Act of Dec. 5, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-512, 88 Stat. 1609.
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impartiality might reasonably be questioned."' This new statute,
according to legislative history, 3 is intended to conform with
Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct.4 Canon 3C(1) envi-
sions that a judge should disqualify himself any time his conduct
would lead a reasonable man, knowing all the circumstances, to
conclude that there exists an appearance of either impropriety or
lack of impartiality.5 The dictates of the new statute are, how-
ever, more forceful than those of the Code; the statute substitutes
a command, "shall disqualify himself," for the recommendation
of the Code, "should disqualify himself."6 Thus section 455(a)
requires disqualification any time there is an appearance of im-
propriety or lack of impartiality.7
On July 14, 1976, the Tenth Circuit, acting upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus' filed by the Justice Department, disqual-
28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (Supp. IV 1974).
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6351, 6353. See 120 CONG. REC. H10,729 (daily ed. Nov. 18, 1974) (remarks of
Rep. Kastenmeier); 119 CONG. REC. 33029 (1973) (remarks of Sen. Burdick). See also
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbldg. & Dry Dock Co., 407 F. Supp. 324, 326-27
(E.D. Va.), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 539 F.2d
357 (4th Cir. 1976).
ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS, CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, Canon 3C(1) (1975).
1 Id. Canon 3C(I) states in part: "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding
in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. . . . 'See E.
THODE, REPORTER'S NOTES TO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (1973). The Reporter states:
Any conduct that would lead a reasonable man knowing all the circumstan-
ces to the conclusion that the judge's "impartiality might reasonably be
questioned" is a basis for the judge's disqualification. Thus, an impropriety
or the appearance of impropriety . . . that would reasonably lead one to
question the judge's impartiality in a given proceeding clearly falls within
the scope of the general standard, as does participation by the judge in the
proceeding if he thereby creates the appearance of a lack of impartiality.
Id. at 60-61. See also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts,
86 HARV. L. REv. 736, 745 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification of Judges].
Compare text accompanying note 2 supra with Canon 3C(1), supra note 5.
See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8, 14-16, 60-61. See also United States v. Brown,
539 F.2d 467, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1976).
1 Not all United States courts of appeals permit the use of the writ of mandamus to
review the refusal of a judge to disqualify himself. However, the Tenth Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit recognize the validity of such a procedure and the trend is toward a more
liberal availability of the writ. See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1051-
52 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler, 354 F.2d
655, 657 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Occidental Petroleum Corp.
v. Chandler, 303 F.2d 55, 56-57 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 915 (1963). See
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ified Chief Judge Willis Ritter of the United States District Court
for the District of Utah.' The Justice Department alleged that the
behavior of Judge Ritter at the pretrial proceedings demonstrated
actual bias or an appearance of bias in favor of the defense attor-
neys and, in turn, against the Government's attorneys and the
Government.' 0 The Tenth Circuit held that the impartiality of
Judge Ritter, in light of the total facts and circumstances, might
reasonably be questioned."
This Comment will analyze the interpretation and applica-
tion of section 455(a) by the Tenth Circuit as reflected in its
opinion in United States v. Ritter.
I. BACKGROUND
Common law originally held that a judge could be disquali-
fied only for "interest," defining it as a direct pecuniary interest.'2
At the time of the establishment of the American court system,
pecuniary interest still was recognized as the only basis for dis-
qualification.'3
In the United States, the first federal disqualification-for-
interest statute was enacted in 1792" and subsequently was
amended to cover both specified relationships and "substantial"
interests.'5 The 1948 version of section 455 stated:
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel,
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected with
any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion,
for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding therein.' e
also 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3553, at
386-87 (1975) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER]; Note, Disqualification
of Judges for Bias in the Federal Courts, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1435, 1440 n.45 (1966); Com-
ment, Disqualification for Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 US.C. § 455, 71
MIH. L. REV. 538, 548 n.42 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Disqualification for Interest].
United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 944 (1976).
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 462, 464.
1 Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609 (1947); Note,
Disqualification of Judges for Prejudice or Bias-Common Law Evolution, Current Sta-
tus, and the Oregon Experience, 48 ORE. L. REV. 311, 321-22 (1969).
Frank, supra note 13, at 611-12.
" Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 455
(Supp. IV 1974)).
*5 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3541, at 343.
* 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970) (amended 1974).
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The "of counsel" phrase was literally construed; it was held to be
applicable in situations where the judge had been an attorney for
one of the parties in the same proceeding now before him.'7 Au-
thorities were in conflict as to whether "substantial" interest re-
ferred only to a pecuniary interest or whether it could be applied
to "substantial" interest in the outcome of a case." The "material
witness" clause was construed as limiting disqualification to situ-
ations where the judge was actually called as a witness and the
testimony sought was relevant to the proceeding. 9 Disqualifica-
tion under the final clause, "so related to or connected with any
party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his opinion, for
him to sit on the trial," was within the discretion of the judge in
question; and appellate courts rarely overturned the decision of
a trial judge who failed to disqualify himself.2 0
A second basis for disqualification of federal judges was cre-
ated in 1911 with the enactment of a statute which provided that
a judge could be disqualified for bias or prejudice." This statute
was replaced in 1970 by the similar, current section 144.2 Section
144 states in part:
Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes
and files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom
the matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against
him or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no
further therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such
proceeding.Y
In order to create a legally sufficient affidavit, certain procedural
and factual standards must be satisfied. Foremost among these
"1 In re Grand Jury Investigation, 486 F.2d 1013, 1015 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417
U.S. 919 (1974). See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 550.
1 See Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 553, 555. Compare United States
v. Bell, 351 F.2d 868, 878 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 947 (1966), with Adams
v. United States, 302 F.2d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 1962).
" Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 557-58. See, e.g., United States v. Re,
372 F.2d 641, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 912 (1967); United States v. Gilboy,
162 F. Supp. 384, 400-01 (M.D. Pa. 1958).
Disqualification for Interest, supra note 8, at 559; Disqualification of Judges, supra
note 5, at 738-39. See, e.g., Shadid v. Oklahoma City, 494 F.2d 1267, 1268 (10th Cir. 1974);
United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205-06 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 834
(1970).
2" Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 21, 36 Stat. 1090 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §
144 (1970)).
- 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970).
" Id.
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is that the affidavit must state specific facts which support the
allegations of bias and prejudice. 4
Some courts and commentators have advocated applying an
"appearance" standard when interpreting this statute.15 How-
ever, most courts have strictly interpreted not only the procedural
and factual requirements, but also the phrase "personal bias or
prejudice," holding that the bias must be derived from a source
that is extrajudicial in nature." The term "party," as contained
in the statute, has been construed as requiring that the bias be
directed at a litigant; thus, bias directed at the attorney for the
litigant would not suffice. 7
The recent revision of section 455 provided the third ground
for disqualification: Where there exists an appearance of impro-
priety or lack of impartiality. 8 Disqualification on this basis has
been such a rare phenomenon in the past that section 455(a)
reflects a new trend in judicial disqualification.29 Since the revi-
sion of this section was intended to codify Canon 3C(1) of the
Code,30 the notes of the Reporter to the Code should be viewed
as an authoritative source in interpreting the new statute.' The
14 Id. Other relevant standards are: (1) That the affidavit must be certified by a
counsel of record, stating that it is made in good faith; (2) it must be filed in accordance
with certain time requirements; and (3) there is a limit of one filing per litigant per case.
Id.
25 See Note, Disqualification of a Federal District Judge for Bias-The Standard
Under Section 144, 57 MINN. L. REV. 749, 763-69 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Section 1441. See also Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State
Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 100 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v.
Thompson, 483 F.2d 527, 528 (3d Cir. 1973), prohibition & mandamus denied sub nom.
Luongo v. United States Court of Appeals, 415 U.S. 911 (1974); United States v. Moore,
405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976).
" United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966). See WRIoHr, MILLER,
& COOPER, supra note 8, §§ 3542, 3551, at 345-47, 374; Disqualification Under Section 144,
supra note 25, at 756-58.
11 See Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 504-05 (N.D. Cal.
1976); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497, 522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
See also Disqualification Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756-58.
" See text accompanying notes 1-7 supra.
20 WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3549, at 369. But see, Public Util.
Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1952); United States v. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc., 497 F.2d 107, 109 (5th Cir. 1974); Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 812 (3d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Moore, 405 F. Supp. 771, 773 (S.D. W. Va. 1976); United
States v. Quattrone, 149 F. Supp. 240, 242 (D.D.C. 1957).
31 See note 3 supra.
31 See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
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Reporter explicitly adopted the "appearance" standard by stat-
ing that the appearance of impropriety or a lack of impartiality
falls within the general standard of Canon 3C(1).12 Section 455(a)
establishes an objective standard, which requires the judge to
disqualify himself if there exists a reasonable factual basis which
casts doubt upon his impartiality.3 With this background in
mind, the opinion of the Tenth Circuit in Ritter can be analyzed.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Judge Ritter was serving as the trial judge in a criminal
antitrust action.34 At the arraignment on November 24, 1975,
Judge Ritter granted motions for bills of particulars for some of
the defendants and stated that he would grant similar requests
for the other defendants upon the filing of the appropriate mo-
tions. The judge granted these further motions at a January 16,
1976 hearing. At the same time, and over the objections of the
Government's attorneys, he entertained and granted additional
defendants' motions for further bills of particulars.
35
Prior to the January 16 hearing, the Government's attorneys
learned that six "anti-Ritter" resolutions had been considered by
the Utah State Bar Association. The attorney for one of the defen-
dants, Mr. Christensen, served as president of this association
during the period in which these resolutions received considera-
tion .3
Based on a connection between the bar association proceed-
ings and the behavior of Judge Ritter at the January 16 hearing,
the Government's attorneys filed an affidavit requesting the
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6351, 6356.
3' See note 5 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6351, 6354-55. The legislative history states that section 455(a) functions as
a "catch-all" provision, the purpose of which is to promote public confidence in the
impartiality of the judiciary. Id. The concept of "public confidence" has become the focal
point for advocates of liberal disqualification. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 8; Miller,
Public Confidence in the Judiciary: Some Notes and Reflections, 35 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROB. 69, 74 (1970); 7 CuM. L. REv. 185, 191-92 (1976).
" 540 F.2d at 460.
" Id.
" Id. At the state bar meeting, Mr. Christensen delivered the recommendation of the
bar association's Board of Commissioners, which advised the membership on the disposi-
tion of the resolutions. Two of the resolutions were approved on a secret ballot. Id. at 460-
61.
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judge to disqualify himself. They alleged that this connection
resulted in actual bias or an appearance of bias. 7 Judge Ritter
denied the disqualification motion 38 on the grounds that the affi-
davit failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of sections 144
and 455(a), and that the alleged facts were insufficient to support
a motion to disqualify.
39
In response, the Government's attorneys filed with the Tenth
Circuit a petition for a writ of mandamus, alleging: (1) That Mr.
Christensen served as Judge Ritter's attorney during considera-
tion of the "anti-Ritter" resolutions by the Utah State Bar Asso-
ciation, and that such a relationship constituted "actual bias";
(2) that the conduct of Judge Ritter at the January hearings
reflected "actual bias" in favor of Mr. Christensen and, in turn,
against the Government's attorneys and the Government; and (3)
that the total facts created an "appearance of bias."4
III. ALLEGATIONS OF ACTUAL BIAS
A. A Finding of Fact
The first issue presented by the Government's attorneys re-
quired the Tenth Circuit to determine whether Mr. Christensen
functioned as Judge Ritter's attorney in the proceedings con-
ducted by the Utah State Bar Association. The Government's
attorneys, basing their affidavit upon section 144, contended that
"actual bias" resulted from the relationship of Mr. Christensen
and Judge Ritter.4 The Tenth Circuit disposed of this contention
on a finding of fact. The court held that the record did not demon-
strate advocacy by Mr. Christensen on behalf of Judge Ritter but
rather that the attorney performed his official duties as President
of the Utah State Bar Association in a fair and impartial man-
ner.
42
In disposing of this issue, the Tenth Circuit distinguished
cases cited by the Government's attorneys-Rapp v. Van Dusen43
and Texaco, Inc. v. Chandler.44 In Rapp, a federal district court
11 Id. at 461.
38 Id.
11 Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
,0 540 F.2d at 461.
1 Id. at 461, 462-63.
11 Id. at 463.
' 350 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1965).
4 354 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
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judge was disqualified from a civil action where, upon a petition
for a writ of mandamus to the Third Circuit, it was found that
counsel for the defense had also represented the judge in the same
proceeding.5 In contrast, Mr. Christensen in Ritter did not func-
tion in the same proceeding as counsel for both defendant and
Judge Ritter.
In Texaco, Inc., the Tenth Circuit granted a petition for a
writ of mandamus which requested the disqualification of a fed-
eral district court judge from a civil action. It was found that one
of the plaintiff's attorneys had represented the judge in another
civil action that was pending at the same time, and in the same
court, as the proceeding in question." In contrast to the situation
in Texaco, Inc., the proceedings of the Utah State Bar Associa-
tion were not a civil action that was pending before the federal
district court in Utah. Thus, the first allegation of the Govern-
ment's attorneys was unsupported by precedent.
B. Adverse Rulings and an Insufficient Factual Basis
The Tenth Circuit viewed the second issue of "actual bias"
as based on two alleged grounds: (1) Judge Ritter's January 16
rulings on the motions of the defendants for bills of particulars
and (2) Judge Ritter's "caustic and overbearing" behavior toward
the Government's attorneys. 7 The court disposed of the first
ground on a finding of fact by noting that the granting of the
defendants' motions at the January 16 hearing had no connection
with the proceedings before the Utah State Bar Association. 8
Judge Ritter had announced his intention to grant these motions
on November 24, 1975, and the opinion established that the
"anti-Ritter" resolutions first came to the attention of the judge
about January 3, 1976.11
As to the second ground, the Tenth Circuit conceded that
Judge Ritter's behavior toward the Government's attorneys was
indeed "caustic and overbearing."' 0 However, the court noted
,1 350 F.2d at 808-10. The plaintiffs motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,6 354 F.2d at 656-57. Defendant's motion requesting disqualification was based on
the pre-1974 section 455. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
,1 540 F.2d at 463.
I Id.




that such behavior does not invariably demonstrate bias or preju-
dice against a party. The court concluded by commenting on the
weakness of the factual basis presented within the petition of the
Government's attorneys." As noted, specific facts are required to
uphold a section 144 motion to disqualify.12 Holding that the
Government's attorneys failed to establish actual bias by the alle-
gations contained in the first two contentions, the Tenth Circuit
directed its attention to the final issue-whether there existed an
appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality sufficient to
support a section 455(a) motion to disqualify.
IV. SECTION 455(a): APPEARANCE OF BIAS
A. Elements
When dealing with a section 455(a) motion to disqualify, it
is critical to determine what elements are necessary to establish
an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartiality. Four issues
must be addressed. First, what are the procedural requirements?
Second, must the judge's alleged disqualifying behavior be for or
against a party, or may it be for or against an attorney? Third,
must the disqualifying behavior have an extrajudicial source, or
may the source be judicial in nature? Finally, what factual basis
is necessary to support a motion for disqualification?
1. Procedural Requirements
In rejecting the Government's affidavit requesting his dis-
qualification under sections 144 and 455(a), Judge Ritter found
the affidavit technically defective, under both statutes, because
it failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of section 144.51 As
section 455(a) is wholly unrelated to section 144, the requirements
for section 144 should not control.
54
51 Id.
52 See text accompanying note 24 supra.
- Petitioner's Brief for Mandamus at 8.
54 Even though section 455 has no procedural requirements, the affidavit of actual
bias or prejudice could serve as one procedural vehicle for filing a section 455 motion to
disqualify. WRIGHT, MILLER, & CooPERa, supra note 8, §§ 3541, 3550, at 343-44, 372. See
Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs, 524 F.2d 98, 102 n.8 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F. Supp. 1275, 1277 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
See also Note, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias Under 28 U.S.C. Section 144
and Revised Section 455, 45 FORDHAM L. REv. 139, 153-54 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Disqualification Under Revised Section 4551.
Even assuming that section 144 could substantively affect section 455, such effect
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Aside from noting Judge Ritter's rejection of the affidavit for
a failure to satisfy "technical requirements,"55 the Tenth Circuit
omitted any direct consideration of procedural requirements.
However, the court recognized that section 144 prescribes the
procedure for filing a motion for disqualification based on actual
bias, whereas it failed to make a similar observation concerning
section 455(a) as to an appearance of bias." One could view the
Tenth Circuit's silence on this issue as a refusal to impose upon
section 455(a) the procedural requirements associated with sec-
tion 144.
2. May the Disqualifying Behavior Be Directed at an
Attorney? May the Disqualifying Behavior Have a Judicial
Source?
The second and third issues are closely related and may be
disposed of concurrently. In Davis v. Board of School Commis-
sioners of Mobile County,57 the Fifth Circuit construed sections
144 and 455(a) in pari materia. The court, therefore, held that the
construction of section 144 applied to section 455(a)-in essence,
that the disqualifying conduct of a judge must be directed at a
party rather than an attorney, and that the source of the conduct
must be extrajudicial in nature.58 The Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
tion is open to question.59 In section 144 the concepts of party, as
opposed to attorney, and the extrajudicial source, as opposed to
the judicial source, derive from the terms "party" and "personal"
should be restricted to section 455(b)(1). 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1974) states in
part: "He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a
personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. ... Thus, the interpretations of section
144 could govern the substantive law applications of section 455(b)(1) because both deal
with the same grounds, i.e., "actual bias." However, as these grounds are wholly un-
related to section 455(a), section 144 provisions should not apply. WRIGHT, MILLER, &
CooPFR, supra note 8, § 3542, at 345-46.
540 F.2d at 461.
Id. at 461-62.
57 517 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
517 F.2d at 1052.
" It should be noted that the case law cited by the Fifth Circuit in support of its
contention involved only the interpretation and application of section 144. Id. at 1050-51.
See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966); United States v. Board
of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 81 (7th Cir. 1974); United States ex rel. Wilson v.
Coughlin, 472 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1973); Giebe v. Pence, 431 F.2d 942, 943 (9th Cir.
1970); Hanger v. United States, 398 F.2d 91, 101 (8th Cir. 1968).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
contained within that statute. 0 Section 455(a) contains no simi-
lar language."
On these issues, the Tenth Circuit refrained from direct con-
sideration of the question of extrajudicial/judicial source. How-
ever, the court rejected the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of the
attorney/party issue, and held that the disqualifying behavior
may be directed either for or against an attorney.6" In support of
such a conclusion, the court noted that the language of section
455(a) permitted flexibility in determining whether disqualifica-
tion is warranted in a particular situation.13 Such a finding was
necessary as the Tenth Circuit apparently viewed the major prob-
lem as favoritism toward Mr. Christensen. On the possibility that
favoritism existed, the court was willing to impute bias.64
3. Factual Basis/Reasonable Basis
a. Introduction
The legislative history of section 455(a) indicates that a
"reasonable factual basis," or "reasonable basis," must be estab-
lished when attempting to disqualify a judge.65 A fear has been
expressed that such a "reasonable basis" concept would be used
to impose a narrow construction upon the new provision.6 In
Davis, the Fifth Circuit adopted the "reasonable factual basis"
standard. There, the court noted that the standard was designed
to eliminate a subjective "in the opinion of the judge" test. 7 In
Parrish v. Board of Commissioners of Alabama State Bar,"6 the
Fifth Circuit indicated that a "reasonable factual basis" consis-
" See WRIGHT, MILLER, & COOPER, supra note 8, § 3542, at 346-48; Disqualification
Under Section 144, supra note 25, at 756, 758. See also United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
384 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1966); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 497,
522-23 (D.S.C. 1975).
Compare text accompanying note 23 supra with text accompanying note 2 supra.
62 The Ritter court stated "for bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly
result in bias toward the party. Thus, if a judge is biased in favor of an attorney, his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned in relationship to the party." 540 F.2d at 462.
"Id.
' See note 62 supra.
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6351, 6355.
U Comment, Disqualifying Federal District Judges Without Cause, 50 WASH. L. REV.
109, 132 (1974).
7 517 F.2d at 1052.
6s 524 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
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ted of facts sufficient to raise a reasonable inference, in the con-
text of the issues presented in a particular situation, of a lack of
impartiality on the part of a judge."
In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit failed to acknowledge the
"reasonable factual basis" standard. The court twice noted that
there was a dearth of facts supporting the petition of the Govern-
ment's attorneys,70 but emphasized that "circumstances" are
important.7 The court noted that section 144 requires facts suffi-
cient to prove actual personal bias, but stressed that section
455(a) provides a broader, more flexible ground for disqualifica-
tion.72
Had the court then discussed why an appearance of impar-
tiality is essential, there would be little reason for criticizing the
import of this decision. However, the court digressed into a dis-
cussion of a prior line of cases in which Judge Ritter had been
disqualified." The Tenth Circuit failed to cite any authority hold-
ing that the consideration of such unrelated, prior cases was ap-
propriate for determining the factual basis necessary to support
a section 455(a) motion to disqualify. It is unfortunate that the
court failed to elaborate upon the proper balance of facts and
circumstances necessary to support such a motion.
b. The appearance of impartiality: from whose
perspective?
Another pertinent issue in determining whether a sufficient
"reasonable basis" exists for disqualifying a judge is from whose
perspective-the judge's or the litigants'-should the matter be
viewed? By emphasizing the concept of "reasonable factual
$ 524 F.2d at 103-04. Parrish has been misconstrued as requiring, to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify, facts which would convince a reasonable man that a bias
exists. See United States v. Zagari, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
540 F.2d at 462-63.
'Id. at 462. See also United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45, 51 n.5 (10th Cir. 1976);
Bumpus v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 385 F. Supp. 711, 714 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
" 540 F.2d at 461-62.
7 Id. at 464. See Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173 (1956); United States v.
Ritter, 273 F.2d 30, 32 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 950 (1960); United States
v. Hatahley, 257 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 899 (1958). Judge Ritter has
run afoul of the Tenth Circuit on occasions more recent than those cited in the opinion.
See, e.g., Utah-Idaho Sugar Co. v. Ritter, 461 F.2d 1100 (10th Cir. 1972); United States
v. Peterson, 456 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1972).
"1 One student note views the distinction as being between the perspectives of the
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basis," many decisions have viewed the motion to disqualify from
the perspective of the challenged judge, thus imposing a narrow
construction upon section 455(a).1 Other courts and commenta-
tors have urged that when applying an "appearance" standard,
the proper perspective is that of the challenging litigant. Such an
interpretation is said to be more in keeping with the spirit of the
new provision. 6 The language of the revised statute" indicates by
its plain meaning that the emphasis should be upon the judge's
impartiality being reasonably questioned and not upon whether
his partiality is reasonably likely to exist. 8
The Tenth Circuit in Ritter captured the spirit of the new
provision. Avoiding all mention of a "reasonable factual basis"
concept, the court instead chose to emphasize that Congress re-
vised section 455(a) to conform with the Code and, furthermore,
that litigants have a right to expect impartiality in a federal
district court.7 9
CONCLUSION
In interpreting section 455(a), the Tenth Circuit applied a
liberal disqualification policy. 0 In doing so, it aligned itself with
uninvolved observer and the litigant. See Disqualification Under Revised Section 455,
supra note 54, at 148-49.
"5 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 103-04 (5th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 517 F.2d
1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Mavis v. Commercial Car-
riers, Inc., 408 F. Supp. 55, 61-62 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Pentronix, Inc.,
403 F. Supp. 367, 373-74 n.ll (E.D. Pa. 1975); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 395 F.
Supp. 1275, 1277-79 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Lazofsky v. Sommerset Bus Co., 389 F. Supp. 1041,
1044-45 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
7 See, e.g., Parrish v. Board of Comm'rs of Ala. State Bar, 524 F.2d 98, 109 (5th Cir.
1975) (Tuttle & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). See also J.
MAcKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JusTIcE 240 (1974).
" See text accompanying note 2 supra.
7' See note 76 supra. In answering the question of whether a judge's "impartiality
might reasonably be questioned," one must focus upon whether, considering all the facts
and circumstances, the litigant might reasonably doubt the judge's impartiality, not upon
whether the litigant has factually established that the judge is actually partial. See H.R.
REp. No. 1453, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
6351, 6354-55. See also Note, Judicial Ethics-Recusal of Judges-The Need for Reform,
77 W. VA. L. REv. 763, 773 (1975).
T, 540 F.2d at 462, 464.
SO In Ritter, the Tenth Circuit, to an uncertain degree, qualified its liberal disqualifi-
cation approach by noting that a criminal prosecution was involved. Id. at 464. Unfortu-
nately, the court refrained from elaborating upon the significance of this element. Section
455(a) fails to distinguish between a civil action and a criminal prosecution. See text
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those who view the appearance of impartiality from the perspec-
tive of the challenging litigant. Thus, the court committed itself
to the following propositions: (1) that a section 455(a) motion to
disqualify need not satisfy the strict "technical" requirements of
section 144; (2) that the disqualifying behavior of a judge may be
directed at an attorney as well as at a party; and (3) that circum-
stances can be as dispositive as facts in determining whether
there exists an appearance of impropriety or lack of impartial-
ity.8 '
The opinion of the court draws criticism on two aspects.
First, the court should have amplified its reasoning as to why a
section 455(a) motion to disqualify need not satisfy the
"technical" requirements of a section 144 motion to disqualify.
Second, the court should have elaborated upon the proper bal-
ance of facts and circumstances necessary to support a section
455(a) motion to disqualify.
However, the Tenth Circuit should be commended for cap-
turing the spirit of the new provision. The opinion in United
States v. Ritter should be regarded as the forerunner of a progres-
sive trend in the area of judicial disqualification.
Brian A. Magoon
accompanying note 2 supra. Hopefully, the Tenth Circuit meant only that a criminal
prosecution is one additional factor to be considered when a petition for a writ of manda-
mus has been sought. There is no support for a holding that bases the application of a
liberal disqualification policy solely upon whether the proceeding in question is a criminal
prosecution. See E. THODE, supra note 5, at 60-61. See also H.R. REP. No. 1453, 93d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1-13, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6351-57.
11 540 F.2d at 461-62.

